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ADAM ELDEAN*
Can the United States Control its
Natural Gas?: International Trade
Implications of Restrictions on
Liquefied Natural Gas Exports
ABSTRACT
This article examines the cross-section between energy, environmen-
tal, and international law while exploring the recent developments of
liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to non-free trade agreement
countries, and considers how international free trade agreements af-
fect efforts to restrict or limit exports of LNG. The article discusses
the environmental and economic impacts of large-scale exports of
LNG, but argues that efforts to stifle LNG exports will ultimately
fail regardless of potential negative impacts due to conflict with ex-
isting international trade agreements, including the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade and the North American Free Trade
Agreement. Since approval of export licenses for LNG is inevitable,
the article offers proposals to achieve safe natural gas production and
considers factors that are important in understanding the greater im-
pacts of the United States becoming a major exporter of LNG.
INTRODUCTION
“Exporting natural gas would increase fracking and carbon
emissions, put sensitive ecological areas at risk, and do noth-
ing to address our country’s energy problems.”1 — Sierra Club
“If the federal government approves more of these export ter-
minals to send America’s natural gas to China and Europe,
then we’ll eventually be exporting our manufacturing jobs
abroad along with the fuel. America should exploit her com-
petitive advantage with lower natural gas prices to create jobs
in the United States, not export natural gas to create more
* J.D., May 2014, The George Washington University Law School in Washington,
D.C.; Senior Production Editor 2013-14, George Washington Journal of Energy and
Environmental Law. Eldean worked at White & Case in Warsaw, Poland, the American
Wind Energy Association, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission while in law
school. He would like to thank Kathryn Lannon and Ryan Fitzpatrick for their comments
and guidance throughout the writing of this article, and his friends and family for their
love and support.
1. Stop LNG Exports, SIERRA CLUB, http://content.sierraclub.org/naturalgas/stop-
lng-exportshttp://content.sierraclub.org/naturalgas/stop-lng-exports (last visited Feb. 4,
2014).
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440 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 54
profits for oil and gas companies.”2 — Congressman Ed Mar-
key (April 17, 2012)
Buzzwords like “clean energy” and “energy independence” are
very attractive at a time when the United States is attempting to lessen its
carbon footprint and wean itself off of foreign oil, but the energy source
rising to the surface in the United States is fueling a heated debate con-
cerning the safety of its extraction and the economic implications of
large-scale exports from the United States. While coal continues to be the
cheapest fossil fuel for generating electricity, it is also the dirtiest.3 The
current low price of natural gas and its abundance in the United States
are convincing many in the electric-generating industry that increased
reliance on natural gas is inevitable,4 but do these expectations hold true
if this cheap natural gas is shipped abroad in large quantities?
Both support for and opposition to the export of U.S. natural gas
are growing. Two years after the approval of the Sabine Pass liquefied
natural gas (LNG) export facility, the Department of Energy (DOE) fi-
nally moved forward with the processing of non-free trade agreement
(FTA) LNG export applications by conditionally approving an applica-
tion by Freeport LNG.5 Newly confirmed Energy Secretary, Ernest
Moniz, claims the agency will move “expeditiously” to evaluate more
applications, although he also announced that additional research is
needed before the more than 20 pending applications can be approved.6
Speaking before Congress, Moniz pledged he would act on the export
applications before the year’s end.7 Still, the fight to prevent large-scale
exports of LNG to non-FTA countries will surely continue, as evidenced
by continued opposition even as LNG export facilities are coming to frui-
tion. Sabine Pass LNG filed a construction update with the Federal En-
2. Press Release, Natural Resources Committee Democrats, Markey: Sabine LNG Ex-
port Facility Approval Would Help Export U.S. Manufacturing Jobs (Apr. 16, 2012), availa-
ble at http://democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/press-release/markey-sabine-lng-
export-facility-approval-would-help-export-us-manufacturing-jobs [hereinafter Markey
Press Release].
3. Electric Generation Using Natural Gas, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.
org/overview/uses_eletrical.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
4. Id.
5. Freeport LNG Expansion, L.P. and FLNG Liquefaction, LLC, DOE/FE Order No. 3282,
Order Conditionally Granting Long-Term Multi-Contract Authorization to Export Lique-
fied Natural Gas by Vessel from the Freeport LNG Terminal on Quintana Island, Texas to
Non-Free Trade Agreement Nations (May 17, 2013), available at http://energy.gov/sites/
prod/files/2013/05/f0/ord3282.pdf.
6. Marie Cusick, Moniz: Department of Energy Will Move ‘Expeditiously’ on LNG Ex-
ports, STATEIMPACT, June 17, 2013, http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2013/06/17/
moniz-department-of-energy-will-move-expeditiously-on-lng-exports.
7. Id.
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ergy Regulatory Commission (FERC)8 reporting that the plant’s
liquefaction and purification trains one and two are over 50 percent com-
plete and will be completed by February 2016 and June 2016, respec-
tively, and that trains three and four will be completed by April 2017 and
August 2017, respectively.9 Amid this construction milestone, there are
legal challenges to the Dominion Cove Point LNG terminal in Maryland
state courts.10 Meanwhile, American’s Energy Advantage, a group of in-
fluential manufacturers and municipal gas distributors, sent a letter to
Energy Secretary Moniz urging the DOE to stop approving application
for LNG exports.11
Part of the controversy stems from two ways of looking at the
environmental pros and cons of a shift to natural gas. Natural gas is seen
by many as a “bridge fuel,” thought to have less of an environmental
impact when compared to conventional oil or coal, but many recent
studies claim the overall footprint of shale gas production is much
higher than oil or coal.12 Natural gas emits less carbon than coal at the
point of combustion, but recent studies show that overall greenhouse gas
emissions from shale exploitation may be greater than coal when emis-
sions from the production process of shale gas are taken into account.13
Shale gas production requires thousands of trucks to transport the water
needed for the hydraulic fracturing (commonly known as “fracing” or
8. FERC, an independent federal agency within the DOE, is responsible for authoriz-
ing the siting and construction of onshore and near-shore LNG import or export facilities
under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. Under Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, FERC
issues certificates of public convenience and necessity for LNG facilities engaged in inter-
state natural gas transportation by pipeline. FERC also prepares environmental assess-
ments or impact statements for proposed facilities under its jurisdiction as required by the
National Environmental Policy Act. LNG, FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/in-
dus-act/lng.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
9. Sabine Pass LNG L.P. and Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC, Monthly Progress Report,
Docket Nos. CP11-72-000 & CP13-2-000, FERC (Dec. 2013) available at http://elibrary.ferc.
gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=13442521.
10. Max Ehrenfreund, Natural Gas Export Project Could Hinge on Court Case, WASH. POST
(Jan. 12, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/natural-gas-export-pro-
ject-could-hinge-on-court-case/2014/01/12/5c9ccf10-7892-11e3-b1c5-739e63e9c9a7_story.
html.
11. AEA Sends Letter to Sec. Moniz Urging Him to Reconsider Approval of New Natgas
Export Applications, AMERICA’S ENERGY ADVANTAGE (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.americas
energyadvantage.org/blog/entry/aea-sends-letter-to-sec.-moniz-urging-him-to-recon-
sider-approval-of-new-nat.
12. See Robert W. Howarth et al., Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural
Gas Shale Formations, CLIMATIC CHANGE, Mar. 2011.
13. Beren Argetsinger, Comment, The Marcellus Shale: Bridge to a Clean Energy Future or
Bridge to Nowhere? Environmental, Energy and Climate Policy Considerations for Shale Gas De-
velopment in New York State, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 329 (2011).
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“fracking”) process, and it requires the use of generators, compressors,
high-powered mobile diesel engines, and condensate tanks.14 These tech-
niques lead to the emissions of methane, volatile organic compounds,
and fine particulate matter.15 The practice of “flaring,” the burning of gas
used to eliminate gas at exploration sites and to test production of the
well, releases more than 60 pollutants into the air, including methane
and cancer-causing benzene.16 The fracking fluid, which is pumped into
the earth to break up the rock and allow for the release of gas, includes a
number of chemical additives.17 These additives cause some of the most
concern due to the proprietary, secretive nature of the formula and the
unknown effects of the chemicals on human health and the environ-
ment.18 The potential pollution effects are causing environmentalists to
push back against both the expansion of the fracking process and gas
company plans to begin shipping high quantities of natural gas in liquid
form to other countries where more profit can be realized.19
Despite these environmental effects, natural gas production con-
tinues with a new focus on selling the valuable energy source to interna-
tional markets. The movement towards exporting more natural gas is
mostly due to the increased use and demand of LNG outside of North
America, strong natural gas production in the United States, and rela-
tively low natural gas prices in the United States compared to other
global markets.20
14. Id. at 336.
15. Id.
16. Henning Gloystein et al., U.S. Shale Causes Rise in Waste Gas Pollution, REUTERS,
May 3, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/03/us-energy-gas-flaring-idUSB
RE8410US20120503.
17. CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: FACT SHEET 2 (May 2012), available at
http://www.chk.com/Media/Educational-Library/Fact-Sheets/Corporate/Hydraulic_
Fracturing_Fact_Sheet.pdf. The additives Chesapeake Energy lists as making up two per-
cent of fracking fluid are acid, anti-bacterial agent, breaker, clay stabilizer, corrosion inhibi-
tor, crosslinker, friction reducer, gelling agent, iron control, pH adjusting agent, scale
inhibitor, and surfactant. Id.
18. See Craig Segall, Look Before the LNG Leap: Why Policymakers and the Public Need Fair
Disclosure Before Exports of Fracked Gas Start, SIERRA CLUB, 11, 42 (2012), available at http://
www.sierraclub.org/naturalgas/downloads/LOOK-BEFORE-YOU-LEAP.pdf (citing well-
site management, including flowback water, spills at the surface, leaks through well cas-
ings, and contaminant migration from the fracking site as the most pressing water contami-
nation sources during the process).
19. See, e.g., Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC Sabine Pass Lng, L.P., 140 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61076 (Jul.
26, 2012) (Sierra Club bringing an action regarding a natural liquefaction project citing
FERC’s reluctance to consider the potential impacts of increased production of shale gas).
20. Annual Energy Outlook 2012 Early Release Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 2
(2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2012).pdf.
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Transporting natural gas in liquid form is necessary when natural
gas needs to be transported long distances outside of a pipeline net-
work.21 LNG is produced by removing impurities from natural gas and
then liquefying the natural gas, which results in a form that is easier to
transport to international markets.22 The LNG is then loaded into double-
hulled ships and shipped to a receiving port where it is converted back
into its gas form.23
To export natural gas from the United States, natural gas compa-
nies must navigate some federal red tape. Any company proposing to
site, construct, or operate LNG import/export facilities requires federal
approval from the FERC24 pursuant to Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act
(NGA).25 Any company seeking authorization to export LNG from the
United States must file an application with the Department of Energy’s
Office of Fossil Energy (DOE/FE) for authorization, which is dependent
on whether the proposed export is consistent with the public interest.26
Alongside the threat of environmental harm, some claim large-
scale LNG exports could have detrimental economic consequences. U.S.
Senator Ed Markey has been vocal against LNG exports, pointing to the
potential loss of manufacturing jobs and wealth transfer from U.S. citi-
zens to oil and gas companies.27 The American Public Gas Association
also opposes large-scale LNG exports, citing the likely increase in the
price of domestic natural gas for homeowners and businesses around the
country, loss of a chance for the country to become energy independent,
and the return of coal as a dominant electric generation fuel.28
In order to combat this potential harm, environmental and politi-
cal forces, motivated for different reasons, are pursuing action to limit
LNG exports. Although attempts to stop LNG exports to protect the en-
vironment or the U.S. natural gas consumer’s wallet may be well-in-
tended, this article argues that this approach is unlikely to achieve the
21. See generally About U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINIS-
TRATION, http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipe
line/index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
22. Liquefied Natural Gas, OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://en-
ergy.gov/fe/science-innovation/oil-gas/liquefied-natural-gas (last visited Feb. 19, 2014)
[hereinafter Liquefied Natural Gas].
23. Id.
24. MICHAEL RATNER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42074, U.S. NATURAL GAS EX-
PORTS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES, UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES 2 (2011), available at http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/misc/R42074.pdf.
25. 15 U.S.C § 717b (1938).
26. Id.; Liquefied Natural Gas, supra note 22. R
27. Markey Press Release, supra note 2. R
28. APGA Opposes the Large-scale Export of LNG, AMERICAN PUBLIC GAS ASS’N (Jan.
2013), http://www.apga.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3746.
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desired results and would instead divert attention and effort away from
more promising reforms. Existing international trade agreements, such
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), will ultimately prevent any
real restrictions on the export of LNG. As attempts to impose export re-
strictions will surely fail, focusing efforts on better regulation of natural
gas extraction will be more fruitful to ensure safe operations in the natu-
ral gas industry. For parties attempting to protect the low prices of do-
mestic natural gas, the inevitable approval of LNG exports leaves no
options to prevent international purchasers from entering the U.S.
market.
Part I of this article examines the current state of the natural gas
industry in the United States and abroad, reviewing the current regula-
tions applicable to siting and constructing LNG terminals and the regula-
tions relating to the approval of LNG exports to international markets.
Part II reviews the argument for restrictions or a ban on LNG exports
from the United States. Part III warns of international trade law that may
be violated as a result of restricting LNG exports. Part III also argues that
attempts to restrict LNG exports are not likely to be valid under the
GATT and other free trade agreements, and these efforts to restrict LNG
exports will be ineffective in achieving the ultimate goal of politicians
and environmentalists to prevent large-scale natural gas exports. Part IV
offers proposals to achieve safe natural gas production that coincide with
the inevitable approval of export licenses for LNG, and offers predictions
and added factors that are important to understanding the greater im-
pacts of the United States becoming a major exporter of LNG.
I. CURRENT STATE OF THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
To understand the recent focus on LNG exports, it is important to
begin with an examination of the U.S. natural gas industry and its regu-
lation. This section provides some background information regarding
the history of natural gas extraction in the United States and reviews the
major federal statute regulating the extraction and the exportation of nat-
ural gas: the NGA.29
A. Natural Gas and Hydraulic Fracturing
Natural gas is made up of mostly methane and currently provides
one-fifth of all the energy used in the United States, with a portion of the
gas produced in the United States used in homes for heating, lighting,
29. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2012).
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and cooking and almost half used by industry.30 As with other fossil fu-
els, limits on use often correlate with the ability to extract the energy
resource from the earth.31
Much of the controversy surrounding natural gas is connected to
the horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing process, where drillers
force high-pressure fluids into a shale formation to create cracks, or frac-
tures, which improve the flow of gas and make unconventional gas re-
sources, like shale gas, economically viable.32 The prospect of extracting
natural gas from shale formations in the United States can be traced to
the early 1800s, with the first United States commercial natural gas well
producing gas from shale in Fredonia, New York in 1821.33 Hydraulic
fracturing was first used to stimulate oil and gas wells in the late 1940s,
and the development of downhole motors, important for directional
drilling technology, accelerated in the early 1970s.34 The combination of
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling technologies, used in the
Barnett Shale of Texas in the 1990s,35 has changed the natural gas game
in the United States, and its further technological improvements has led
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)36 to predict that the
United States will become a net exporter of LNG in 2016 and a net ex-
porter of total natural gas (including via pipelines) in 2020.37
30. Natural Gas Introduction, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.fossil.
energy.gov/education/energylessons/gas/index.html.
31. Id. (explaining the difficulty in producing natural gas from certain known forma-
tions and the efforts to develop technology that will allow its economical production).
32. Natural Gas Production, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.fossil.
energy.gov/education/energylessons/gas/gas_production.html.
33. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SHALE GAS: APPLYING TECHNOLOGY TO SOLVE AMERICA’S EN-
ERGY CHALLENGES 3 (Mar. 2011), available at http://energyindepth.org/wp-content/up
loads/2012/03/Shale_Gas_March_2011.pdf.
34. Id.
35. HALLIBURTON, U.S. SHALE GAS, AN UNCONVENTIONAL RESOURCE, UNCONVENTIONAL
CHALLENGES 1 (2008), available at http://www.halliburton.com/public/solutions/contents
/shale/related_docs/H063771.pdf.
36. The U.S. Energy Information Administration is the statistical and analytical agency
within the U.S. Department of Energy that collects, analyzes, and disseminates indepen-
dent and impartial energy information to promote sound policymaking, efficient markets,
and public understanding of energy and its interaction with the economy and the environ-
ment. About EIA, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/about/
(last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
37. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2013 Early Release
10–11 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2013).
pdf; see also EIA Report Estimates Growth of U.S. Energy Economy Through 2040, OFFICE OF
FOSSIL ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Dec. 5, 2012), http://energy.gov/articles/eia-report-
estimates-growth-us-energy-economy-through-2040.
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The pipeline has prompted two main concerns from environmen-
tal groups, politicians, and others opposed to LNG expansion: (1) the
environmental impacts stemming from an expansion in LNG exports,
and (2) the potential increases in the domestic price of natural gas. For
various reasons, opponents to LNG exports argue that an expansion
would be against the “public interest,” and DOE/FE approval of LNG
exports to countries without a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is condi-
tional on whether such approval is in the “public interest.”38 They also
argue that an expansion of LNG exports is likely to result in increased
domestic fracking, which entails environmental effects not taken into ac-
count in National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)39 reviews for the
siting, construction, and operation of an LNG facility; the approval of
LNG export applications; or in the recent DOE study regarding the im-
pacts of LNG exports.40
B. Natural Gas Act
The starting point for understanding why there is controversy
surrounding LNG exports is the NGA. The NGA41 of 1938 marks the first
time the natural gas industry was subject to direct federal regulation.42
Section 3 of the NGA requires approval by the Department of Energy
(DOE) for the import and export of natural gas (including LNG) and
requires approval by FERC for the siting, construction, and operation of
LNG import and export facilities.43 Pursuant to Section 3 of the NGA, the
38. The countries that have a Free Trade Agreement with the United States are Austra-
lia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Peru, and Singapore. See Free
Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, www.ustr.gov/trade-agree-
ments/free-trade-agreements (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
39. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq. (1991).
40. See generally Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC Sabine Pass Lng, L.P., 140 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61076
(July 26, 2012). “[The] April 16 Order rejected Sierra Club’s assertion that the Liquefaction
Project will induce the production of additional natural gas resources found in shale forma-
tions throughout the United States, thus requiring the Commission to consider the environ-
mental impacts of such additional production. The Commission concluded that any
potential impacts associated with additional production are not reasonably foreseeable as
contemplated by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing
NEPA, and therefore were not considered in the EA. The April 16 Order found that, with
the conditions imposed in the order, the Liquefaction Project was not inconsistent with the
public interest.” Id. at I(6-7).
41. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b.
42. See Natural Gas Act of 1938, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://
www.eia.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngmajorleg/ngact1938.html
(last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
43. Id.
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DOE/FE must determine whether approval of the proposal is in the pub-
lic interest when approving applications to export LNG to nations that
have not signed a Free Trade Agreement with the United States.44
In contrast, the DOE/FE lacks discretion in approving exports to
nations that have signed a free trade agreement.45 “Exportation of natural
gas to a nation with which there is in effect a free trade agreement re-
quiring national treatment for trade in natural gas” will be deemed to be
consistent with the public interest, and applications for these exports will
be granted by DOE/FE “without modification or delay.”46 This FTA
“consistent with the public interest” presumption provision was likely
adopted without taking into account that the United States would be-
come a major natural gas exporter because it was adopted 20 years ago
to speed up Canadian gas imports.47 This automatic approval process
effectively removes all discretion and power from the DOE in determin-
ing whether massive exportation of LNG is truly consistent with the
public interest. If a company is granted approval for exporting LNG by
the DOE, it must then obtain approval from FERC to operate or modify
44. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b. The statute states,
“[N]o person shall export any natural gas from the United States to a for-
eign country or import any natural gas from a foreign country without
first having secured an order of the Commission authorizing it to do so.
The Commission shall issue such order upon application, unless, after op-
portunity for hearing, it finds that the proposed exportation or importa-
tion will not be consistent with the public interest. The Commission may
by its order grant such application, in whole or in part, with such modifi-
cation and upon such terms and conditions as the Commission may find
necessary or appropriate, and may from time to time, after opportunity
for hearing, and for good cause shown, make such supplemental order in
the premises as it may find necessary or appropriate.”
Id. “Commission” refers to the Federal Power Commission, which has since been dissolved
and whose authority to authorize natural gas exports has been delegated to the Depart-
ment of Energy, Fossil Energy. See Department of Energy Redelegation Order No. 00-
002.04E (Apr. 29, 2011), available at https://www.directives.doe.gov/sdoa/delegations-
documents/002.04E/view. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission was separately
delegated authority relating to the permitting, siting, construction, and operation of export
facilities. See Department of Energy Delegation Order No. 00-004.00A (May 6, 2006), availa-
ble at https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/siting/doe-delegation.pdf.
45. See Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c).
47. See Segall, supra note 18, at 4. The Sierra Club is concerned that the Trans-Pacific R
Partnership, a possible trade agreement that includes major natural gas importers such as
Japan, could allow automatic approval of LNG exports to these countries, which may not
necessarily be consistent with the public interest. Id.
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export terminals.48 These facilities are multi-billion dollar projects, and
many companies are planning to convert facilities previously used as
LNG import facilities.49
There is some disagreement as to the extent to which the DOE/FE
must take into account the environmental impacts of a proposed applica-
tion for exports of LNG and what factors should be considered for deter-
mining what constitutes the “public interest.”50 A recent DOE study
(examined in Part II) of the macroeconomic impacts of LNG exports sug-
gests that increased exports result in a net benefit to the U.S. economy;
however, the study is wholly devoid of environmental considerations.51
FERC has also stated its position that the detrimental environmental im-
pacts of increased fracking activity are not “reasonably foreseeable” as
defined by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations for
NEPA review.52 Irrespective of how the DOE/FE defines the “public in-
terest,” under current U.S. domestic law the decision to restrict export
licenses and LNG exports will hinge on this term.
II. WHY SHOULD WE LIMIT LNG EXPORTS?
The following section examines two of the chief arguments for re-
stricting LNG exports: the negative environmental effects from increased
fracking and the economic impacts.
48. Michael Levi, The Hamilton Project, A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports, Policy
Brief 2012-05 3-4 (June 2012) available at http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads
_and_links/06_exports_levi.pdf.
49. Id.
50. See Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC Sabine Pass LNG, L.P., 140 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61076 (July 26,
2012). Order denying Sierra Club’s request for rehearing and stay of orders granting Sabine
Pass Liquefaction, LLC and Sabine Pass LNG, L.P. authorization to site, construct, and
operate facilities for the liquefaction and export of domestically produced natural gas at the
existing Sabine Pass LNG terminal located in Cameron Parish, Louisiana. The Sierra Club
argued that FERC “failed to consider the project’s reasonably foreseeable indirect effect of
inducing additional shale natural gas production and the associated environmental im-
pacts,” with FERC arguing that it is virtually impossible to estimate how much, if any, of
the export volumes associated with the project will come from existing or new shale pro-
duction. Id. FERC also argued that even if the inducement of shale development was deter-
minable, any impacts which may result from future shale developments are not
“reasonably foreseeable” as defined by the CEQ regulations. Id.
51. See generally NERA Economic Consulting, Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG Exports
from the United States, http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/gasregulation/reports/nera_
lng_report.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
52. Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC Sabine Pass LNG, L.P., 140 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61076 (July 26,
2012).
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A. Potential Environmental Impacts of Increased LNG Exports
Sierra Club is one of the most prominent voices in opposition to
the expansion of LNG export terminals and applications to export do-
mestically-fracked natural gas.53 The environmental group insists that
authorization of facilities and exports will harm the public interest by
increasing domestic prices and will also cause many environmental im-
pacts.54 One of the group’s biggest concerns is that increasing natural gas
exports will inevitably cause natural gas production to increase. The Sec-
retary of Energy Advisory Board’s Shale Gas Production Subcommittee
issued a report in November 2011 recommending enhanced regulation
and research because “if action is not taken to reduce the environmental
impact accompanying the very considerable expansion of shale gas pro-
duction expected across the country—perhaps as many as 100,000 wells
over the next several decades—there is a real risk of serious environmen-
tal consequences causing loss of public confidence that could delay or
stop this activity.”55
Air pollution associated with shale gas production, including ex-
ploration, drilling, flaring, equipment operation, extraction, and vehicu-
lar traffic pollution, releases volatile organic compounds, nitrogen
oxides, particulates from diesel exhaust, toxic air pollutants, and green-
house gases.56 The amount of water used in the drilling and fracking pro-
cess generally ranges from two million to four million gallons per
operation.57 The fracking fluid, mostly water and sand, includes a num-
ber of additives that, while they amount to less than two percent of the
fluid, pose major concerns for potential ground and surface water con-
53. See generally Segall, supra note 18. R
54. Sierra Cl. Mot. to Intervene., Protest, and Comments In the Matter of Cheniere Marketing,
LLC, FE Docket No. 12-97-LNG, 1 (Dec. 26, 2012), available at http://www.fossil.energy.
gov/programs/gasregulation/authorizations/Orders_Issued_2012/SC_MTI_Protest__
Comments_12_26_12.pdf.
55. SECRETARY OF ENERGY ADVISORY BOARD SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SECOND-NINETY DAY REPORT 10 (Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/90day_Report_Second_11.18.11.pdf; see also Segall, supra note
18, at 7. R
56. Ramo´n A. Alvarez & Elizabeth Paranhos, Air Pollution Issues Associated with Natural
Gas and Oil Operations, Air and Waste Management Association (2012), available at http://
www.edf.org/sites/default/files/AWMA-EM-airPollutionFromOilAndGas.pdf; see also
Argetsinger, supra note 13, at 331; GASLAND (Josh Fox, Int’l WOW Co. 2011), available at R
http://www.gaslandthemovie.com.
57. OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS, DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER at ES-4 (April 2009), available at http://energy.gov/sites/
prod/files/2013/03/f0/ShaleGasPrimer_Online_4-2009.pdf [hereinafter Modern Shale Gas].
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tamination.58 This fracking fluid returns to the surface with the natural
gas and some natural formation water, and after the fracking process the
water is usually disposed of through underground injection, treatment
and discharge, and recycling.59
In addition, there are often land and community impacts from the
drilling, including well pads that can cover three acres and associated
infrastructure that transforms rural areas into giant construction sites.60
These land impacts can negatively affect property values, and the
changed landscape is generally no longer suitable for wildlife habitat.61
Scientists have also linked wastewater injection from drilling operations
to a magnitude 5.7 earthquake in Oklahoma in 2011.62 These environ-
mental concerns are very serious, and it is generally accepted that an
expansive LNG export policy will lead to more exploitation of shale gas
formations.63
B. Potential Economic Impacts of Increased LNG Exports
Simple economics suggest an increase in demand for natural gas
will necessarily raise the price of natural gas. Even so, the extent of a
price increase of natural gas in the United States, or whether there will be
any increase at all, is a hotly debated topic.64 On December 5, 2012, the
DOE/FE released a long-awaited report on the macroeconomic impacts
of LNG exports that finds, under all studied scenarios, that the United
States is projected to gain net economic benefits as the level of U.S. LNG
58. CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, supra note 17; see also Segall, supra note 18, at 11 (citing well- R
site management, including flowback water, spills at the surface, leaks through well cas-
ings, and contaminant migration from the fracking site as the most pressing water contami-
nation sources during the process).
59. CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, supra note 17. R
60. Segall, supra note 18, at 12. R
61. Id. at 12–13.
62. Jason Palmer, Oklahoma Earthquake Linked to Oil Extraction Wastewater, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-21952428.
63. See CHARLES EBINGER ET AL., EVALUATING THE PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED EXPORTS OF
LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FROM THE UNITED STATES: AN INTERIM REPORT 1-15 (The Brookings
Institution ed. 2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/pa-
pers/2012/1/natural%20gas%20ebinger/natural_gas_ebinger_2.
64. E.g., TOM CHOI & PETER J. ROBERTSON, DELOITTE CENTER FOR ENERGY SOLUTIONS AND
DELOITTE MARKETPOINT LLC, EXPORTING THE AMERICAN RENAISSANCE: GLOBAL IMPACTS OF
LNG EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES 2 (2013), available at https://www.deloitte.com/
assets/Dcom-Uruguay/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industrias/GlobalImpact%20feb13.
pdf (predicting only a marginal increase in U.S. domestic prices, at about $0.15/MMBtu
from 2016 to 2030).
35502-nm
n_54-2 Sheet No. 122 Side A      11/04/2014   15:34:52
35502-nmn_54-2 Sheet No. 122 Side A      11/04/2014   15:34:52
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\54-2\NMN202.txt unknown Seq: 13 17-OCT-14 9:47
Fall 2014 CAN THE U.S. CONTROL ITS NATURAL GAS? 451
exports increase.65 The report claims that the “benefits that come from
export expansion more than outweigh the losses from reduced capital
and wage income to U.S. consumers, and hence LNG exports have net
economic benefits in spite of higher domestic natural gas prices. This is
exactly the outcome that economic theory describes when barriers to
trade are removed.”66
The DOE report has done little to satisfy the critics of LNG ex-
ports. Furthermore, what this “net economic benefit” will actually look
like is another debate, with some predicting it will be a wealth transfer
from the majority of Americans to the minority of wealthy corporations
that own natural gas resources or LNG export infrastructure.67 U.S. Sena-
tor Ron Wyden, the chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Re-
sources Committee, claims that the flaws of the study “are numerous and
render this study insufficient for the [DOE] to use in any export determi-
nation . . . . The NERA study would need to be updated with new EIA
projections, more realistic market assumptions, regional impacts of the
proposed actual export terminals, and evaluations of the actual impacts
on consumers and businesses of exporting LNG.”68 U.S. Senator Ed Mar-
key, ranking member of the Natural Resources Committee, also finds se-
rious problems with the DOE report, claiming that it used old data and
underestimated growth that has already occurred in domestic natural
gas demand.69
C. The Possible Upsides to LNG Exports for Environmentalists
Although increased production of natural gas appears to be the
immediate effect of large-scale LNG exports, there may be some benefits
to exporting LNG for the environmentally conscious. Arno Harris, the
CEO of Recurrent Energy, a leading solar project developer, is making
some waves in the renewable energy sphere by supporting LNG exports
65. See generally W. DAVID MONTGOMERY ET. AL., NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING,
MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF LNG EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES (Dec. 3, 2012), http://
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/nera_lng_report.pdf.
66. Id. at 1.
67. Memorandum from the Sierra Club to the U.S. Dept. of Energy (Feb. 25, 2013),
available at http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/authorizations/export
_study/reply_comments/Sierra_Club02_25_13.pdf [hereinafter Sierra Club Memorandum].
68. Press Release, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Highlights Flaws in DOE Export
Study (Jan. 10, 2013), available at http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/
wyden-highlights-flaws-in-doe-export-study-.
69. Press Release, Natural Resources Committee Democrats, Markey Exposes Huge
Flaws in Natural Gas Export Report (Dec. 17, 2012), available at http://democrats.
naturalresources.house.gov/press-release/markey-exposes-huge-flaws-natural-gas-export-
report.
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and encouraging others to join him.70 With cheap gas flooding the mar-
ket, a major concern was the likely result of natural gas replacing renew-
able energy in the marketplace, but Harris sees the picture differently.71
Harris argues that one big downside of cheap domestic natural gas is
that the United States is now exporting coal to Europe, and the coal that
is displaced by natural gas in the United States is being burned some-
where else in the world.72 Exporting natural gas, Harris argues, would
likely result in displacement of coal both domestically and abroad, re-
sulting in lower net carbon emissions.73 Secondly, Harris recognizes that
cheap natural gas hinders the development of renewable energy, and
LNG exports could help boost the price of gas in the United States, mak-
ing solar and wind energy more competitive.74
For the environmentalist, a best-case scenario situation is a prop-
erly regulated fracking process coupled with huge exports of natural gas
to make way for renewable energy in the United States because of higher
domestic gas prices. Those parties concerned with rising prices of natural
gas in the United States would not be happy with this outcome, and it is
difficult to see a scenario where domestic prices of natural gas will not
increase, even if the increase is small.75 Once the United States begins
exporting LNG on a large-scale, the margins between the United States
and global markets for natural gas will likely narrow, making LNG ex-
ports less profitable, which in turn could mean a slow-down of these
exports and an equalizing of global prices.76 But this new price for natu-
ral gas will surely be higher than current prices.77 This price increase will
hurt the consumer the most, while the increases in price are likely wel-
comed by gas companies because it translates to higher profit.78
70. Arno Harris, Export Natural Gas to Accelerate Our Clean Energy Future, CLEAN EN-
ERGY FUTURE BLOG (Mar. 12 2013, 5:00 PM), http://arnoharris.typepad.com/cleanenergyfu-
ture/2012/12/export-natural-gas-to-accelerate-our-clean-energy-future.html.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also Carolyn Lochhead, Solar Chief Argues for Natural Gas Exports, POLITICS
BLOG FROM THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Jan. 10, 2013), http://blog.sfgate.com/
nov05election/2013/01/10/solar-chief-argues-for-natural-gas-exports/.
73. See Harris, supra note 70. R
74. Id.
75. CHOI & ROBERTSON, supra note 64, at 2 (predicting a small increase in the average R
U.S. domestic gas price, about $0.15/MMBtu from 2016 to 2030, and that once the export
markets soften, the margins between the United States and global markets will narrow and
limit the LNG export volumes without government intervention).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See generally Sierra Club Memorandum, supra note 67. R
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III. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
Natural gas is recognized as a commodity, like other energy prod-
ucts, and therefore is subject to obligations contained in Annex 1A to the
World Trade Organization (WTO)79 Agreement. Section 3 of the Natural
Gas Act already provides some discretion for approval of exports. This
discretion may on its own be inconsistent with obligations under the
GATT because the extended period of time the DOE/FE takes to deter-
mine whether to allow LNG exports to non-FTA countries could be de-
scribed as a restriction on the exports.80 If legislation were passed
banning LNG exports, although at this time it appears unlikely,81 it
would amount to a clear move against the idea of liberal free trade under
the GATT. The following is an analysis of international trade agreements
that would be violated if restrictions on LNG exports came to fruition.
This article examines the most applicable provisions of the GATT and
NAFTA in relation to LNG exports from the United States.
A. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The GATT, a multilateral agreement regulating international
trade, serves to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers, resulting in the
liberalization of international trade.82 The GATT was signed in 1947 and
79. “The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organiza-
tion dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements,
negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their par-
liaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers
conduct their business.” What is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
80. GATT Articles XI:1 and XIII:1 impose disciplines on the use of export restrictions if
such restrictions are not otherwise waived or justified by exceptions in other GATT articles.
See Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2012).
81. See Keep American Natural Gas Here Act of 2012, H.R. 4025, 112th Cong. (2012)
(re-introduced as H.R. 1191 on Mar. 14, 2013). Representative Ed Markey introduced this
bill in an effort to keep U.S. natural gas in the United States by requiring natural gas ex-
tracted from federal lands to be resold only to American consumers. The bill does not
appear to have the support needed to pass. See H.R. 1191: Keep American Natural Gas Here
Act, GovTrack, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1191 (predicting a one per-
cent chance of the bill being enacted) (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
82. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. The preamble states its
purpose of “entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.” Id. The WTO includes 159 mem-
ber countries and 25 observer governments. Understanding the WTO: The Organization,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
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replaced by the WTO in 1995, but the original GATT text is still in effect
under the WTO framework.83 The signatory countries84 entered into the
agreement recognizing that cooperation in trade could help with “raising
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the
full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production of
the exchange of goods.”85 The basic GATT rules are: States may not dis-
criminate between “like products” from different countries (Article I),
known as the “most favored nations” principle; States may impose tariffs
on imports, but the tariffs may not exceed the limits specified in the
GATT (Article II); States may not discriminate between “like products”
that are imported and those domestically produced (Article III), known
as the “national treatment” principle; and States may not impose “quanti-
tative restrictions” on trade (Article XI).86
While the GATT rules generally encourage liberalization of trade,
the treaty includes exceptions to those rules. Article XX87 of the GATT
83. See generally Understanding the WTO: Basics, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
84. The initial countries to sign the GATT were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma,
Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovak Republic, France, India, Lebanon, Lux-
emburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
85. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Preamble, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], as amended by Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 82. R
86. ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 1093
(6th ed. Aspen Publishers 2011).
87. See GATT, supra note 85, at 37–38: R
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be con-
strued to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(c) relating to the importation or exportation of gold or silver;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relat-
ing to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated
under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents,
trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices;
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or
archaeological value;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.
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allows for an exception to the rules for “protect[ion] [of] human, animal
or plant life or health” and “the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources.”88 Article XX provides the exception “relating to the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consump-
tion.”89 The Preamble to the GATT also portrays an understanding of the
need to protect and preserve the environment:
Recognizing that [Members’] relations in the field of trade and
economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to rais-
ing standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large
and steadily growing volume of real income and effective de-
mand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods
and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable de-
velopment, seeking both to protect and preserve the environ-
ment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at differ-
ent levels of economic development.90
Countries using an environmental exception defense to justify restrictive
measures on trade must show that (1) the restrictive measure produced a
material contribution to the achievement of the measure’s objectives; (2)
the restrictive measure was the least restrictive measure within the
meaning of Article XX(b); and (3) the restrictive measure was not arbi-
trary or unjustifiable nor was it a disguised restriction on international
trade.91
B. NAFTA
NAFTA is a free trade agreement between the United States, Ca-
nada, and Mexico, creating the largest free trade area and linking 450
million people and $17 trillion worth of goods and services.92 As of Feb-
ruary 2013, pipeline exports to Canada and Mexico account for 98 per-
cent of the total natural gas exports of the United States, and relatively
88. Id. at 37; see also Aaron Ezroj, Climate Change and International Norms, 27 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 69, 90–96 (2011) (reviewing the application of Article XX to environmental
concerns).
89. GATT, supra note 85, at 38. R
90. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 82. R
91. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Re-treaded
Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R 101–102 (Dec. 3, 2007).
92. North American Free Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRE-
SENTATIVE, (Dec. 25, 2013 6:00 PM), http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta.
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low natural gas prices in the United States increased the demand for nat-
ural gas in Mexico and led to a 24 percent rise in exports to Mexico in
2012.93 Keeping in mind this existing demand for natural gas from Ca-
nada and Mexico, in addition to challenges under the GATT, NAFTA can
also function as a barrier for restrictions on LNG exports from the United
States. Articles 603 and 604 of NAFTA mirror GATT controls regarding
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports of energy products, and
these provisions prevent a country from imposing minimum or maxi-
mum import or export price requirements.94 The provision also disallows
a tax, duty, or charge on the export of energy products unless it is
equally imposed domestically.95 Parties may apply trade restrictions on
energy products when such products “although traded with another
NAFTA party, originates from or has a final destination [of] the territory
of a non-party against which the party maintains the trade restrictions.”96
Much of the criticism regarding NAFTA and energy trade focuses
on the United States and its undying thirst for fossil fuels, which caused
domestic Canadian prices to rise.97 Mexico restricts exports of crude oil,
natural gas, and petrochemicals to the United States, but this was a spe-
cial exception carved out during the NAFTA negotiations due to the
Mexican Constitution requiring state control of its energy sector.98 With
the capability of becoming a major natural gas exporter, the United
States has changed roles—from natural gas importer to natural gas ex-
porter. It is unlikely that the United States foresaw Articles 603 and 604
of NAFTA having an impact on its ability to export natural gas because
the United States saw itself only as an importer of natural gas. These
provisions should prevent the United States from implementing quanti-
tative restrictions (such as a minimum-export prices), taxes, charges or
duties, unless these provisions are applied to all parties equally, includ-
ing goods consumed domestically.
93. U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports 2012, U.S. Energy Information Administration,
(July 23, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/importsexports/annual/#tabs-supply-2.
94. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 603, ¶ 2, Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] states: “The Parties understand that the provi-
sions of the GATT . . . [prohibit] minimum or maximum export price requirements and,
except as permitted in enforcement of countervailing and antidumping orders and under-
takings, minimum or maximum import-price requirements”; see also Stacey L. Middleton,
How the Petroleum Addict Negotiates With the Dealer: Challenges to the Bush Administration’s
North American Energy Policy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 177, 186–87 (2003) (explain-
ing changes to cross-border trade regulations under NAFTA Chapter Six).
95. Middleton, supra note 94, at 187. R
96. NAFTA, supra note 94, at art. 603, ¶ 3. R
97. Middleton, supra note 94, at 178. R
98. Id. at 186.
35502-nm
n_54-2 Sheet No. 125 Side A      11/04/2014   15:34:52
35502-nmn_54-2 Sheet No. 125 Side A      11/04/2014   15:34:52
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\54-2\NMN202.txt unknown Seq: 19 17-OCT-14 9:47
Fall 2014 CAN THE U.S. CONTROL ITS NATURAL GAS? 457
C. Export Restrictions Will Run Afoul of International Agreements
The following is an examination of how international trade law
has historically impacted restrictions on domestic goods, and an explora-
tion of how these cases may be instructive for the issue of restrictions on
LNG export from the United States.
1. Historical Restrictions on Exports: Chinese Rare Earth Minerals
and Alaskan Oil
The recent controversy over Chinese rare earth elements and the
1973 Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act, described below, are
very similar to current attempts to restrict LNG and are instructive of the
likely outcome. The Chinese rare earth element example shows a coun-
try’s attempt to restrict the export of its natural resources and the results
of a challenge under international law. The banning of exports of Alas-
kan North Slope Oil resulting from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza-
tion Act of 1973 demonstrates the willingness of the United States to ban
exports in certain situations while using the “public interest” standard to
justify that decision.
a. Chinese Rare Earth Minerals Trade Quotas
Rare earth minerals are naturally occurring solids that contain the
rare earth elements, lanthanides and yttrium, which are used in mature
markets such as catalysts, glassmaking, lighting, and metallurgy.99 Rare
earth elements are chiefly mined and separated in China, so China is
very important to world production.100 The Chinese reluctance to reform
its export policy regarding rare earth minerals provides a parallel situa-
tion to the LNG issue in the United States. China is estimated to be the
source of over 97 percent of the global supply of rare earth minerals.101 In
recent years, China has been placing more restrictions on its rare earth
exports, restructuring its rare earth mineral mining industry, and provid-
ing assistance to the industry in the form of subsidies.102 China’s produc-
tion of rare earth minerals became a fragmented industry without an
effective regulatory regime, leading to thousands of mines with poor
99. See Dr. Ritsuro Mı´yawaki, Rare-Earth Minerals, ACCESSSCIENCE (McGraw Hill Edu-
cation, 2012), http://www.accessscience.com/content/rare-earth-minerals/757627;
THOMAS G. GOONAN, RARE EARTH ELEMENTS—END USE AND RECYCLABILITY: U.S. GEOLOGI-
CAL SURVEY SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2011—5094 (2011).
100. GOONAN, supra note 99. R
101. WAYNE M. MORRISON & RACHEL TANG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42510, CHINA’S
RARE EARTH INDUSTRY AND EXPORT REGIME: ECONOMIC AND TRADE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES 1 (2012).
102. Id. at 1.
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safety and environmental regulatory compliance.103 At the same time, the
overexploitation of China’s rare earth minerals led to a sharp drop in
prices.104 China claims that the restrictions it implemented on exports are
designed to stop the rapid depletion of its resource and to remedy the
safety issues and environmental degradation of its mines.105 On the other
hand, skeptics, like the United States, insist the export restrictions are
intended to provide competitive advantage to China’s domestic down-
stream users over foreign companies, and/or to induce foreign compa-
nies to move their facilities to China.106
In September 2010, the United States took action through the
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied
Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO CLC
(USW) to address the export restraints in a Section 301 petition to the
U.S. Trade Representative.107 In its petition, the United States stated
“China’s reliance on WTO-inconsistent export restraints to dominate the
world market in rare earth and other minerals not only nullifies and im-
pairs benefits accruing to the United States under the WTO Agreement,
it fundamentally distorts trade and competition in the green technology
sector, among others.”108 In December 2010, the United States brought a
WTO dispute resolution case against China, and in February 2011, China
agreed to remove discriminatory subsidies.109
The similarities between China’s rare earth export restrictions and
the arguments to restrict LNG exports from the United States inform
what the United States may expect if it allows further restrictions on
LNG exports. WTO members likely to benefit the most from a robust
LNG export regime in the United States, like Japan,110 could potentially
make the United States answer to international dispute settlement bodies
for its protectionist measures.
103. Id. at 11.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 11–12.
106. See id. at 1–2, 11.
107. USW, Petition for Relief Under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act as Amended, China’s
Policies Affecting Trade and Investment in Green Technology 23 (Sept. 9, 2010).
108. Id.
109. USTR, 2012 Trade Policy Agenda and 2011 Annual Report 175 (March 1, 2012); see also
MORRISON & TANG, supra note 101, at 84. R
110. Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO), reeling from Fukushima incident and looking for
alternative forms of energy, has recently made plans to buy 800,000 tons of light liquefied
natural gas from the United States. Japan’s TEPCO to Buy 800,000 Tonnes of LNG From the
US, GLOBAL POST, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130206/
japans-tepco-buy-800000-tonnes-lng-us.
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b. 1973 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act
Similar to the current situation, the United States was once before
in a position where policymakers saw it as beneficial to keep homegrown
fossil fuels at home. Congress authorized the Trans-Alaska Pipeline sys-
tem in response to the energy crisis caused by the 1973 Arab oil em-
bargo.111 The authorization prohibited the export of Alaskan oil to ensure
“energy independence”112 and effectively put an export ban on Alaska
North Slope oil so it could be consumed domestically.113 The export ban
was largely a result of the lobbying efforts of the U.S. maritime shipping
industry, which saw an opportunity to enlarge its coastal tanker fleet.114
Banning oil exports would have given an advantage to the maritime
shipping industry because Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920
required that cargo shipped between U.S. ports be moved by U.S.-flag
vessels only.115 The export ban was revoked in 1995,116 without being
challenged under GATT rules prohibiting export restrictions, after the
DOE determined “there would be a significant number of benefits to the
United States from allowing the export of [Alaska North Slope] crude”
and President Clinton signed legislation permitting Alaska North Slope
oil exports if they were found to be in the nation’s best interest.117
Although this example does not show how anti-free-trade U.S.
legislation may withstand a challenge under international trade agree-
ments because no challenge was brought, it does demonstrate the will-
ingness of the United States to approve such legislation based on a
determination of what is in the public’s interest. Lifting the ban had little
effect on world oil prices, which stands in stark contrast to the potential
impact of U.S. LNG exports on the world gas market.118 Due to the ex-
pected impact on the world market from the export of U.S. LNG, it is
111. Samuel A Van Vactor, Time to End the Alaskan Oil Export Ban, CATO POLICY ANALY-
SIS No. 227 (May 18, 1995), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-227.html.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Alaska Power Administration Asset Sale and Termination Act of 1995, Pub L No
104-58, 109 Stat 557 (1995).
117. S. Rep. No. 104-78, at 6 (1995); see also Ban Ends on Export of North Slope Crude, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1996, http://articles.latimes.com/1996-04-29/business/fi-64073_1_alaska-
north-slope-crude; Daniel C. Crosby, Energy Discrimination and International Rules in Hard
Times: What’s New This Time Around, and What Can Be Done, JOURNAL OF WORLD ENERGY
LAW AND BUSINESS 15–16 (2012) (discussing the possibility of an export ban challenge).
118. Crosby, supra note 117, at 15–16; Petroleum & Other Liquids, U.S. ENERGY INFORMA- R
TION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=
f000000__3&f=a (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (showing the price of crude oil changing only a
few dollars per barrel following the lift of the ban).
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more likely that a country would bring a challenge under the GATT (or
other international agreement) for restrictions on LNG exports.
2. The United States is Unlikely to Prevail in Justifying GATT
Exceptions
As stated above, Article XX of the GATT allows for an exception
from the GATT rules for “protect[ion] [of] human, animal or plant life or
health” and “the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”119 The
GATT established three standards regarding the application of measures
for justification when attempting to qualify for an exemption from the
GATT rules: (1) there must be no “arbitrary” discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, (2) there must be no “unjus-
tifiable” discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, and (3) there must be no “disguised restriction on international
trade.”120 Article XX could arguably be used by the United States to jus-
tify a restriction on its export of natural gas, but there would be differ-
ences in approach for the proponents of restrictions on LNG exports.
Furthermore, as exemplified in the following sections, the decisions by
international dispute settlement bodies have greatly narrowed the scope
of the Article XX exception.
GATT Article XX(g) allows the adoption of export restrictions re-
lating to the conservation of “exhaustible resources,” but this exception
only applies to restrictions on exports that coincide with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption.121 If the United States relies on the
Article XX(g) exception, it would create a division in the two major pro-
ponents for export restrictions: environmentalists, and those desiring to
consume natural gas domestically. Environmentalists that are concerned
with fracking activities would seemingly invite the idea of defining natu-
ral gas as an “exhaustible resource,” which would likely result in restric-
tions on both domestic consumption of gas and exports of the resource.
On the other hand, parties like the American Gas Association would balk
at the thought of restrictions on domestic consumption, even though
they are advocating for restrictions on exports. Using the Article XX(g)
exception would not be an effective solution to restrict LNG exports for
parties preferring to consume the natural gas domestically.
119. Id.; see also Aaron Ezroj, Climate Change and International Norms, 27 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 69 (2011) (reviewing the application of Article XX to environmental concerns).
120. GLICKSMAN, supra note 86, at 1093. R
121. GATT, supra note 85, at 38. “[R]elating to the conservation of exhaustible natural R
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.” Id.
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An even bigger problem with an Article XX exception argument
for the restriction on LNG exports is the previously unsuccessful at-
tempts by the United States to use this defense before international dis-
pute settlement bodies. If a WTO member state believes it was deprived
of some benefit protected under GATT or other WTO provisions, it may
call for consultations with the other member state.122 If that fails, the com-
plainant state may request the establishment of a Panel.123 A party may
appeal a final Panel Report to the standing Appellate Body.124 The fol-
lowing are several examples of the international dispute settlement bod-
ies’ narrowing the application of the Article XX exception.
In United States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products
from Canada, a GATT Panel refused to accept the exception because the
U.S. import ban to conserve tuna stocks was not made in conjunction
with restrictions on U.S. domestic production or consumption on all tuna
and tuna products.125 Canada argued that the import prohibition was
discriminatory and inconsistent with GATT obligations, while the
United States unsuccessfully argued that the import prohibition was jus-
tified under Article XX(g) of GATT, which provides an exemption for
measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources.”126 The Panel agreed that the prohibition was neither discrimina-
tory nor a disguised restriction on international trade, and that tuna was
indeed an “exhaustible natural resource,” but the Panel found no
equivalent restrictions on domestic production and consumption of
tuna.127 The DOE/FE’s discretion to determine the “public interest” does
not include the power to restrict domestic consumption of natural gas,
which is necessary to meet the Article XX(g) exception, so there would
need to be additional legislation passed in order to meet the GATT Arti-
cle XX(g) conditions.
In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line, which resulted from the United States applying stricter rules on the
chemical characteristics of imported gasoline, the Appellate Body re-
jected the Article XX defense because the stricter rules were an “unjustifi-
122. WTO: INSTITUTIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 435–83 (Karen Kaiser et al. eds.,
2006).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. GATT Panel Report, United States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products
from Canada, BISD 29S/91, ¶ 4.9-4.12 (adopted Feb. 22, 1982), available at http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/80tuna.pdf [hereinafter GATT Tuna Panel Report].
126. Id. at ¶ 4.7, note 1; see also NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, ENVIRONMENT AND
TRADE: A GUIDE TO WTO JURISPRUDENCE 87 (Earthscan 2006).
127. GATT Tuna Panel Report, supra note 125 at ¶¶ 4.8-4.12. R
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able discrimination” and “disguised restriction on international trade.”128
Similarly, in United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, the Appellate Body found “unjustifiable discrimination” and
“arbitrary discrimination” in the differing application between WTO
members.129 Although these decisions did legitimize the policy of using
the exception for environmental protection, they also demonstrate that
restrictions on imports or exports will be highly scrutinized.
Furthermore, disguising objectives through carefully worded leg-
islative language is futile because deciding bodies will examine all facts
and surrounding circumstances to determine the true objective of the
legislation. In Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring
and Salmon,130 Canada’s fishery legislation stated that “[n]o person shall
export from Canada any sockeye or pink salmon unless it is canned,
salted, smoked, dried, pickled or frozen.”131 The United States challenged
this language, alleging that the true objective was promotion of the
downstream processor sectors in Canada.132 In determining if the mea-
sures could be justified under an Article XX(g) exception, the Panel
found that the restrictive regulation “covered other fish varieties that
were not subject to export prohibitions.”133 The Panel found that the
prohibitions “could not be deemed to be primarily aimed at the conser-
vation of salmon and herring stocks and at rendering effective restric-
tions on the harvesting of these fish.”134
When a country elects to justify export restrictions using Article
XX of the GATT, there must be a showing of the protections afforded by
the exception. The most recent case on export restrictions is China - Mea-
sures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (China - Raw Mater-
ials),135 where a panel was established to address complaints made by the
128. Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 29, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
reports/wtoab/us-gasoline(ab).pdf.
129. Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 176, 184, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://www.
worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/us-shrimp(ab).pdf.
130. See Panel Report, Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, L/6268 – 35S/98 (Mar. 22, 1988), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/87hersal.pdf [hereinafter GATT Settlement Report].
131. Id. at ¶ 2.2.
132. Baris Karapinar, Exports Restrictions and the WTO Law: How to Reform the ‘Regulatory
Deficiency’, 45 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 1139, 1145 (2011) [hereinafter Exports Restrictions].
133. Id. at 1146.
134. GATT Settlement Report, supra note 130, at ¶ 4.7. R
135. WTO Dispute Settlement, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, (Jan. 28, 2013) available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds394_e.htm [hereinafter China-Raw Materials]; see also Baris
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United States, the European Union (EU), and Mexico concerning China’s
export restrictions on selected minerals.136 The Panel used Article XX to
determine whether China could justify its export duties on specific prod-
ucts.137 China argued that export restrictions were necessary for “scrap”
products138 and “energy-intensive, highly polluting, resource-based
products”139 to protect the health of its population.140 The Panel held that
there was no specific evidence that the export restrictions were part of a
framework to protect human health and reduce pollution associated
with the production and consumption of the raw material at issue.141 The
Panel also examined the availability of less-restrictive alternative means
and found that China’s admission that alternatives did exist supported
the ruling that the imposed export restrictions were not justified.142
Applying China - Raw Materials to the current issue, it does not
appear the United States could establish a convincing argument in sup-
port of export restriction on LNG exports. Using the possible increase in
domestic prices of natural gas as justification for the restrictions would
surely fail because this argument is protectionist. Article XX creates an
exception for the “protect[ion] [of] human, animal or plant life or health,”
but it cannot be used to protect a domestic industry from international
competition. In addition, arguing that the restrictions are an attempt to
conserve a natural resource will also fail because there are no attempts to
simultaneously restrict domestic consumption of natural gas. As stated
above, Article XX(g) allows the adoption of export restrictions relating to
the conservation of “exhaustible resources,” but the exception only ap-
plies to restrictions on exports that coincide with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.143 Environmental concerns with the fracking
process, which is a controversial issue in itself, could be a more viable
Karapinar, China’s Export Restriction Policies: Complying with ‘WTO Plus’ or Undermining
Multilateralism, 10 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 398, 398–408 (2011) (providing extensive analysis
of the China-Raw Materials Case).
136. The materials in question were bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese,
phosphate (yellow phosphorus), silicon (metal and carbide), and zinc. Id. at 390; see also
Exports Restrictions, supra note 132, at 1147. R
137. See China-Raw Materials, supra note 135. R
138. These products included magnesium scrap, manganese scrap and zinc scrap. Ex-
ports Restrictions, supra note 132, at 1149. R
139. Coke, magnesium metal, manganese metal and silicon carbide. Exports Restrictions,
supra note 132, at 1149. R
140. See China–Raw Materials, supra note 135. R
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. GATT, supra note 85, at 38 (“[R]elating to the conservation of exhaustible natural R
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.”).
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argument to justify an Article XX exception if the United States stops
development of unconventional shale gas resources due to the dangers
of fracking. However, this argument is not grounded in the current real-
ity of the natural gas industry. The dangers of fracking are not strongly
established,144 and there are alternatives to restricting exports on LNG
that could help remedy environmental concerns. One example of a possi-
ble less-restrictive alternative is increased regulatory oversight during
the drilling and fracking process, which has the potential to remedy dan-
gers to the environment.145
Many parties complain about the sluggish DOE regulatory ap-
proval of LNG export applications, but the delay of approvals, in itself,
could trigger problems with the international trade agreements. Exerting
pressure on a private sector, even if it consisted of delayed issuances of
export licenses, could arguably be a form of export restrictions. In Japan -
Trade in Semi-Conductors, the European Economic Community brought a
claim under Article XI, which prohibits states from imposing “quantita-
tive restrictions” on trade, regarding an arrangement between Japan and
the United States for trade in semiconductors.146 The arrangement in-
volved preventative measures to avoid dumping147 by Japanese compa-
nies in the U.S. market where Japan agreed to monitor costs and prices
from going below designated company-specific levels.148 The European
Economic Community and third parties, including Australia, Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Brazil, alleged that the measures led to an increase
in prices of semiconductors and caused difficulty for their respective
downstream industries that relied on imports from Japan.149 The Panel
held that the measure exerted various forms of pressure on the private
sector that effectively eliminated the sale of selected semiconductors be-
144. See generally Modern Shale Gas, supra note 57 (outlining the precautions the Depart- R
ment of Energy believes can be addressed to maintain a safe fracking operation).
145. See Beyond Natural Gas: Protecting Our Air, Water and Communities, SIERRA CLUB (last
visited Feb. 10, 2014).
146. Report of the Panel, Japan - Trade in Semiconductors (Japan-Semiconductors), L/6309
(May 4, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/87semcdr.pdf [hereinafter Japan-Semiconductors]; see also Exports Restrictions, supra
note 132 at 1144. R
147. If a country exports a product at a price that is lower than the price it would
normally charge in its domestic market, that country is said to be “dumping” that product
and many governments will take action against dumping to defend their domestic indus-
tries. Opinions differ but it is generally seen as an unfair trading practice. See Anti-dumping,
Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, etc., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm, (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
148. Japan-Semiconductors, supra note 146. R
149. Id.
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low the company-specific prices.150 Foreshadowing what could possibly
occur with respect to the LNG issue at hand, the Panel found that the
undue delay in Japan’s issuance of export licenses, which were non-auto-
matic, constituted a form of export restriction and a breach of Article
XI.151
If all other approaches fail, GATT Article XXV provides for a
waiver of obligations if a country faces “exceptional circumstance” that is
not otherwise provided for in the GATT agreement.152 Because a waiver
is only granted in “exceptional circumstances,” it would be difficult for
the United States to get the required approval by the WTO Members
acting jointly.153 It would also be difficult for the United States to argue
that the LNG export situation is truly an “exceptional circumstance” be-
cause the situation is sufficiently covered by the existing GATT princi-
ples. The reputation of the United States before the international dispute
settlement bodies could also be at risk if it were to defend restrictions on
LNG. If the United States follows through with restrictions on export
licenses, it risks losing credibility when bringing challenges to another
country’s protectionist efforts.
3. GATT Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
In practice, the Natural Gas Act provides for approval “without
modification or delay” for FTA countries by automatically deeming them
as supporting the “public interest.”154 GATT Article I Most-Favored-Na-
tion (MFN) Treatment does not allow a country accorded with MFN sta-
tus to be treated less advantageously than any other country with an
MFN status by the exporting country.155 Described as the “cornerstone”
obligation of GATT, MFN prohibits discrimination among trading part-
ners by establishing a special status of trade with one of the trade part-
ners and not the others.156 The DOE’s discretion in approving export
licenses to non-FTA countries (but countries that are accorded MFN) and
the automatic approval for FTA countries seems to be at odds with the
150. Id. at 31.
151. Id.
152. GATT, supra note 85, at 344. R
153. See id. The U.S. would need to secure a two-thirds vote of approval by the WTO
Members acting jointly as the Contracting Parties. Id. There is no generally accepted defini-
tion or standard criteria to identify what circumstances are deemed exceptional. See, e.g.,
Report of the GATT Working Party, United States-Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act, GATT B.I.S.D. 31st Supp. at 180 (1980).
154. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a), (c) (2012).
155. See GATT, supra note 85, at 2. R
156. Principles of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
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MFN principle. For example, Australia is an FTA country that would
receive automatic approval because it is assumed that this would be in
the public interest, whereas Japan is a non-FTA country and DOE must
determine whether approval of the export license would be in the public
interest. While both of these countries are members of the WTO and
should be afforded MFN Treatment, Australia is clearly experiencing
special treatment through DOE’s statutory discretion.
There are a number of exceptions to the MFN treatment obliga-
tion, such as setting up a free trade agreement that applies only to goods
traded within the group, giving developing countries special access to a
country’s market, or raising barriers against products that are considered
to be traded unfairly.157 However, these exceptions do not appear to
aptly represent the current reasons why DOE/FE would decide not to
approve export licenses to non-FTA countries, while continuing to grant
licenses to FTA countries.158 The existing approval process has not been
seriously challenged, but it does seem to be at odds with MFN treatment
obligations. The potential new role of the United States as a major LNG
exporter could bring to light previously dormant issues with the interac-
tion of the NGA and international trade law.
4. NAFTA: Additional Prohibition on Restriction of Natural Gas
Exports
In addition to WTO obligations, the United States also must navi-
gate the specific provisions in NAFTA regarding energy and petrochemi-
cals, which limits import and export restraints on these products.159 As
stated above, the NGA provides for automatic approval of export li-
censes for countries that have a free trade agreement with the United
States because it is assumed that it is within the “public interest” to ex-
port to these countries.160 Article 309 of NAFTA specifically prohibits
member countries from restricting the exportation of any goods that are
being exported to any other member country except in accordance with
GATT Article XI.161 Article 603.1 incorporates GATT language specifi-
cally referencing prohibitions/restrictions on trade in energy and basic
petrochemical goods:
Subject to the further rights and obligations of this Agreement,
the Parties incorporate the provisions of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with respect to prohibi-
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See NAFTA, supra note 94, at art. 603. R
160. See Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c) (2012).
161. NAFTA, supra note 94, at art. 309. R
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tions or restrictions on trade in energy and basic
petrochemical goods. The Parties agree that this language does
not incorporate their respective protocols of provisional appli-
cation to the GATT.162
NAFTA defines “restriction” to include “any limitation,”163 so this ap-
pears to cover unconventional restrictions in addition to conventional re-
strictions, such as quotas, permits, and licenses.
If the United States applies restrictions on LNG exports, or if the
DOE stalls in the approval of export licenses with FTA-countries, this
would likely be a violation of NAFTA and other applicable free trade
agreements. A purposeful ban on LNG exports would also be difficult
due to the existing pipeline between the United States, Canada, and
Mexico.164 If the United States were to restrict exports of LNG, it would
be possible for abundant U.S. natural gas to flow to Mexico and Canada
and then be introduced to the greater international market through those
countries.165 Although this seems a reasonable way to circumvent a ban
on LNG exports, United States companies would not easily benefit from
those international LNG sales.166
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
It can be concluded that restrictions on LNG exports will not pass
muster under international trade laws, but this is not necessarily the end
of the story. This section provides suggestions to those parties with inter-
ests in restricting LNG exports and presents additional factors that
should be considered to realize the broader picture of what LNG exports
mean for the environment and the economy. Certain measures, including
more stringent state regulation or federal regulation, can be taken to ac-
complish stated goals of export opponents, such as preventing environ-
mental damage during the fracking process, but many of these measures
require strong political will, which may be lacking in Congress.
A. Increased Oversight of the Drilling Process
An obvious solution to ensure protection of the environment is to
implement stronger regulation of the hydraulic fracturing process at the
state and federal level. Natural gas drilling is regulated almost entirely
by the states, resulting in inconsistent and often insufficient protective
162. Id. at art. 603, ¶ 1.
163. Id. at art. 609.
164. Crosby, supra note 117, at 16. R
165. Id.
166. Id.
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measures.167 One of the most troubling concerns with the hydraulic frac-
turing process is the proprietary chemicals used in the process that could
enter drinking water through poor casing construction or spilling of the
flowback wastewater. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s
central authority to protect drinking water is found in the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA), and the protection of underground sources of drink-
ing water is found in the Underground Injection Control (UIC) program
of the SDWA, which regulates the subsurface emplacement of fluid.168
Currently, “the underground injection of natural gas for purposes of
storage” and “the underground injection of fluids or propping agents
(other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations re-
lated to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities” is specifically ex-
cluded under the UIC program.169 This exclusion came under the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 and became known as the “Halliburton Loophole.”170
Other exclusions are also present under the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act.171 Legislation to repeal the fracking exemption under the
SDWA was introduced,172 but Congress is unwilling to come to agree-
ment on the issue. The environmental risks associated with the fracking
process must be answered with appropriate regulation to ensure safety.
This could come in the form of federal regulation of the hydraulic frac-
turing process to overcome the varying, and in some cases insufficient,
167. See Regulations By State, FRACFOCUS: CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE Registry, http://
fracfocus.org/regulations-state (last visited Mar. 9, 2013) (providing links to state regula-
tions of the drilling process); see also Jody Freeman, The Wise Way to Regulate Gas Drilling,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6 , 2012, at A26 (highlighting deficiencies in some state regulations such as
allowing operators to store toxic wastewater from the fracturing process in open pits and
risking surface or groundwater contamination).
168. Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, U.S. ENVT.
PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/
wells_hydroreg.cfm (last update May 4, 2012) [hereinafter Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing
Under the Safe Drinking Water Act].
169. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B); see also Regulation of Hydraulic
Fracturing Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, supra note 168. These exclusions to under- R
ground Injection Control authority were added via the Energy Policy Act of 2005, although
the use of diesel fuel during hydraulic fracturing is still regulated by the UIC program. Id.
170. Fracking: Laws and Loopholes, CLEAN WATER ACTION, http://cleanwater.org/page/
fracking-laws-and-loopholes (last visited March 12, 2013) [hereinafter Fracking: Laws and
Loopholes]; but see Jacquelyn Pless, Fracking Update: What States Are Doing To Ensure Safe
Natural Gas Extraction, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURE (July 2011), http://
www.ncsl.org/issues-research/energyhome/fracking-update-what-states-are-doing.aspx
(describing the efforts of states to safely regulate fracking).
171. Fracking: Laws and Loopholes, supra note 170; see also William J. Brady & James P. R
Crannell, Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation in the United States: The Lasissez-Faire Approach of
the Federal Government and Varying State Regulations, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 39 (2012).
172. Fracturing Responsibilities and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act of 2011, H.R.
1084, 112th Cong. (2011).
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state regulation of the process. There could also be model legislation by a
federal agency that state legislatures could use to improve their state
rules on regulating hydraulic fracturing. The Bureau of Land Manage-
ment has proposed a rule for regulating hydraulic fracturing on federal
and Indian lands that would require: (1) disclosure to the public of chem-
icals used in hydraulic fracturing on public and Indian lands; (2) confir-
mation that wells used in fracturing operations meet appropriate
construction standards; and (3) a requirement that well operators put in
place appropriate plans for managing “flowback” water that returns to
the surface.173 This proposed rule could serve as a model for future state
regulation of the hydraulic fracturing process.
LNG export applications are likely to continue to move forward,
resulting in increased natural gas production, which may provide
enough momentum to encourage a change of heart in Congress. A repeal
of the SDWA exclusion to allow EPA oversight is crucial in developing a
system to protect the nation’s drinking water. Industry disclosure of the
chemicals used in the fracking process is also necessary to ensure safe
practices. Existing federal statutes, including the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, requiring Toxic
Release Inventory reporting under the Emergency Planning and Com-
munity Right-to-Know Act; and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act could be used to regulate hydraulic fracturing fluids.
However, it is unclear at this point whether all of the above listed stat-
utes would be applicable because the chemicals in fracking fluid are
often proprietary secrets, and, consequently, it is unknown what chemi-
cals are being used.
The current system is simply inadequate due to the current frac-
tured state regulatory regime, and the gas industry should be open to
more uniform regulation of drilling. In its current state, a few bad opera-
tions could result in overregulation or an outright ban on drilling. A cat-
astrophic event could force Congress to act, and the resulting regulation
may be too strong-handed. The EIA estimates that strict environmental
regulations on fracking would add just seven percent to the cost of gas
production, so it appears smart regulation of fracking may not be a seri-
ous financial burden.174 A uniform federal regulatory oversight for the
173. Oil and Gas: Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. 34611
(June 10, 2013) (to be codified 43 CFR pt. 3169); Donald Baur et al., BLM Issues Revised
Proposed Fracking Regulations (May 20, 2013), http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/
05_20_2013_EER_Update.PDF.
174. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, IEA WORLD OUTLOOK SPECIAL REPORT ON UN-
CONVENTIONAL GAS, “GOLDEN RULES FOR A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS” 46 (2012).
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industry can strike the balance for environmental protection and the con-
tinuance of responsible drilling.
B. Momentum of Proponents
On February 6, 2013, Congressman Mike Turner introduced the
“Expedited LNG for American Allies Act,” which would streamline the
regulatory process to export natural gas to North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) countries, Japan, and others.175 Suspending judgment on
whether this proposal would also violate international trade law, partic-
ularly the most favored nation principle, this bipartisan legislation
makes claims to “help strengthen our strategic partnership with key al-
lies, reduce the trade deficits and boost job growth right here at home.”176
It follows a companion bill introduced by U.S. Senator John Barrasso,
titled “Expedited LNG for American Allies Act of 2013,” which accom-
plishes many of the same goals as Turner’s bill.177
These two bills seem to be more in line with the recent DOE com-
missioned report (by NERA Economic Consulting) that found increasing
exports of natural gas would have a net positive effect on the economy.178
The report stated that “[i]n all of the scenarios analyzed . . . the United
States would experience net economic benefits from increased LNG ex-
ports. . . . Across the scenarios, U.S. economic welfare consistently in-
creases as the volume of natural gas exports increased.”179 A report by
the EIA released a year prior, also commissioned by the DOE, was more
pragmatic in its conclusions: “increased natural gas exports lead to
higher domestic natural gas prices, increased domestic natural gas pro-
duction, reduced domestic natural gas consumption, and increased natu-
ral gas imports from Canada via pipeline.”180 It is still unclear how
heavily the DOE will rely on the report and whether the Department will
seriously consider the comments submitted that claim deficiencies in the
175. Press Release, U.S. Congressman Mike Turner, Turner Introduces Expedited LNG
for American Allies Act (Feb. 6, 2013), http://turner.house.gov/news/documentsingle.
aspx?DocumentID=319118.
176. Id.
177. Press Release, U.S. Senator John Barrasso, Barrasso Bipartisan Bill Expedites LNG
Exports for NATO Allies, Japan, and Others (Jan. 31, 2013), http://barrasso.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=91e781a6-a66
2-3e05-2f6d-bd5c549dbe3c&Region_id=&Issue_id=.
178. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF LNG EXPORTS FROM
THE UNITED STATES 6 (2012).
179. Id.
180. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, EFFECTS OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS
EXPORTS ON DOMESTIC ENERGY MARKETS 6 (2012), available at http://www.fossil.energy.
gov/programs/gasregulation/reports/fe_eia_lng.pdf.
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report, but it brings up the question of whether the battle against LNG
exports is over.
At a time when the economy is weak and the United States has
the opportunity to capitalize on a hugely profitable resource, it is inevita-
ble for proponents of LNG exports to overlook or downplay the potential
environmental harm and negative economic effects that may follow. Dis-
cussing the possible consequences in abstractions could continue for a
long time, but the final outcome will be felt throughout the United States
and beyond.
CONCLUSION
The extent of the damage that hydraulic fracturing can have on
the environment is still largely unclear, and the real effect of increased
LNG exports on domestic gas prices is highly debated. Although the
DOE appears to be moving towards approving more LNG export li-
censes for non-FTA countries, questions remain as to what is within the
“public interest.” But the unavoidable fact is that the United States is a
party to international trade agreements to which it owes obligations to
foster and support free trade. The available defenses to justify the United
States acting contrary to its GATT and NAFTA obligations will be inap-
plicable in this situation. Regardless, restrictions on LNG exports will
likely only be a short-term solution for those opposing the exportation of
LNG. Preventing the flow of natural gas out of this country is a losing
battle, and short of advocating for a break from international trade agree-
ments, opponents’ exertion of energy on the issue is best spent ensuring
the safe extraction of natural gas and preparing for the potential increase
in the price of domestic natural gas.
